Public Epistemic Handoff Integrity

A Source-Gated Audit Architecture for Scientific Claims in Public Representation

Abstract

Scientific claims routinely move from specialist communities into institutional summaries, journalism, educational materials, and other public representations. Such movement necessarily compresses evidence, method, uncertainty, and inferential structure, but compression alone is not an epistemic defect. This article proposes Public Epistemic Handoff Integrity (PEHI) as a source-gated audit architecture for a restricted class of mature science-to-public transitions. PEHI first requires independent evidence that a bounded scientific claim is operative within a specified specialist community and an analytically traceable source-to-public relation. It then compares source-side and representation-side inferential commitments across claim type, uncertainty, scope, boundaries, added premises, communicated justification, and provenance. Where a public proposition introduces a materially stronger target, the audit reconstructs the bridge and warrant supporting that transition and asks whether the material change remains recoverable from the representation and its traceable source relation, while prohibiting unsupported inference about actual recipient uptake. The framework is stress-tested on climate attribution and Helicobacter pylori as strict core cases, a mediated processed-meat/IARC reporting episode as a material-transformation stress test, and Stephen Hawking's The Grand Design as a boundary-exclusion case. The analysis distinguishes legitimate compression from rhetorical intensification, material transformation, and unsupported inferential expansion. It does not claim a new theory of scientific testimony, appropriate simplification, consensus reporting, or source comparison, nor unique diagnostic power. Its proposed contribution is methodological integration and sequencing: a pre-specified audit procedure for determining which mature scientific handoffs enter analysis, how their transmission and stronger inferential bridges are reconstructed, and which conclusions the analyst is not licensed to draw.

Keywords: science communication; scientific testimony; epistemic integrity; scientific authority; expert consensus; source traceability; inferential transformation; public representation.

1. Introduction — The Problem After Scientific Acceptance

Scientific claims do not remain within the specialist communities that establish, contest, refine, and use them. Claims that become sufficiently established to organize research, clinical practice, technical interpretation, or disciplinary instruction may subsequently enter institutional summaries, expert interviews, textbooks, journalism, museums, documentaries, and other forms of public scientific representation. This movement is indispensable. A society in which scientifically warranted claims could not move beyond specialist communities would be unable to sustain scientific education, public knowledge, or an effective division of epistemic labor.

Movement across that boundary nevertheless changes the epistemic situation. Specialist communities may possess evidential, methodological, and inferential resources that non-specialist recipients neither possess nor could reasonably be expected to reconstruct. Public representations therefore compress. They omit methodological detail, formal derivation, calibration procedures, alternative models, inferential steps, uncertainty structures, and portions of the evidential record.

Such compression is not itself an epistemic defect.

The foundational literature on epistemic dependence already makes clear that modern knowledge cannot require each knower to reconstruct all relevant evidence personally. Hardwig's account of epistemic dependence, Goldman's analysis of novice evaluation of expertise, Anderson's account of lay assessment of scientific testimony, and later work on warranted public trust reject epistemic self-sufficiency as a realistic model of complex knowledge societies (Hardwig 1985; Goldman 2001; Anderson 2011; Irzik and Kurtulmuş 2019). Barimah further argues that second-order assessment itself imposes significant burdens on laypersons and that communicators must bear part of the epistemic burden of science communication (Barimah 2024).

Gerken develops the problem directly through the epistemology of scientific testimony. Scientific testimony, on his account, is properly based on scientific justification, and public scientific testimony can function as a central epistemic authority outside science. His analysis distinguishes scientific expert testimony from science reporting, formulates Non-Inheritance of Scientific Justification, and develops Justification Reporting as a norm according to which science reporters should, when feasible, communicate appropriate aspects of the nature and strength of the scientific justification supporting a reported claim (Gerken 2022).

More recent work narrows the remaining conceptual space. Gelfert and Schneider argue that Justification Reporting necessarily requires simplification and that determining when simplification becomes epistemically misleading is itself a substantial problem. Gerken's response accepts that proper simplification is difficult and emphasizes its dependence on context, audience, and platform (Gelfert and Schneider 2025; Gerken 2026). Pils separately argues that science reporting should track the actual epistemic configuration of expert agreement and disagreement rather than silently impose stronger interpretations than the expert landscape warrants (Pils 2025).

Accordingly, the present article does not propose a new theory of scientific testimony, epistemic dependence, consensus reporting, science reporting, appropriate simplification, or public trust. Nor does it claim that existing approaches are incapable of identifying the transformations examined here.

Its object is narrower.

A scientifically established proposition can enter public representation through a traceable transmission while changing in ways not reducible to the amount of scientific justification communicated. Its causal force may change while substantial evidence is still reported. Its scope may expand while its source remains accurately cited. A category describing the strength of evidence for carcinogenicity may be represented as though it measured the magnitude of risk. Conversely, a public formulation may be dramatically simpler and rhetorically stronger than its specialist source while preserving the proposition's relevant inferential boundaries.

The analytical question is therefore:

How should an independently operative scientific claim and a traceably related public representation be reconstructed and compared so that legitimate compression, materially inferential transformation, and bridge-dominant extrapolation can be distinguished without inferring actual recipient uptake?

The proposed architecture begins with two eligibility conditions:

Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S)

and

Trace_A(q_S,r_P),

where (q_S) is a bounded scientific source claim, (Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S)) indicates that the claim's operative status has been established independently within a specified specialist community (\mathcal C), (r_P) is a specified public representation, and (Trace_A) denotes an analytically defensible source-to-representation relation.

Only after those conditions are met is the public epistemic handoff reconstructed:

q_S \xrightarrow{H_P} r_P.

Public Epistemic Handoff Integrity (PEHI) is the source-gated audit architecture proposed for that reconstruction.

The term integrity names the relation being audited; the proposed contribution is the audit architecture, not the discovery of a previously unidentified epistemic property.

Its governing proposition is:

\boxed{Public\ Epistemic\ Integrity \neq Literal\ Fidelity.}

A representation may legitimately simplify, compress, rephrase, reorganize, and omit much of the scientific justification available at the source. PEHI instead asks whether materially relevant transformations in the public claim and its presented epistemic basis remain sufficiently explicit or reconstructable that the representation does not acquire inferential force unsupported by the operative scientific source.

The proposed increment is correspondingly modest. It is methodological integration and sequencing: mature-source eligibility is established before representation analysis; a traceable claim-specific handoff is required; representation-unit-specific changes are subjected to an explicit inferential-difference test; analyst-visible traceability is separated from audience-visible provenance; communicated scientific justification is separated from observable authority cues; representation analysis is prevented from silently becoming recipient psychology; and bridge-dominant extrapolations are excluded from ordinary science-to-public handoffs.

No individual operation is claimed as novel.

2. From Scientific Correction to a Source-Gated Public Handoff

2.1 Conceptual continuity without formal dependence

The present analysis begins immediately downstream of scientific correction.

A companion RATIUM.AI analysis distinguishes a scientific operative state within a specified scientific community from later public deployment and institutional decision. Its central boundary is that scientific correction and downstream public or institutional transitions involve different actors, authority structures, premises, and empirical literatures and therefore should not be treated as one undifferentiated correction process (RATIUM.AI 2026a).

The present article takes the first public transition beyond that boundary as its object.

It does not import the companion article's state architecture as a formal premise. The relevant condition here is simpler: a bounded scientific claim has attained an independently supportable operative status within an independently specifiable specialist community:

Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S).

This makes the present architecture formally self-contained.

PEHI is nevertheless conceptually downstream of the earlier Corrective Handoff Integrity problem. Both architectures ask whether epistemically material status changes remain inspectable through a transition. The continuity is conceptual rather than formal. Public representation introduces a distinct source-status gate, audience-facing provenance, presented acceptance cues, representation-unit structure, and a recipient boundary that are not components of the scientific-correction architecture. PEHI therefore does not inherit the earlier state sequence; it begins where that sequence deliberately stops (RATIUM.AI 2026a).

2.2 Operative status is not final truth

The expression (Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S)) does not mean

q_S = True

in a final or incorrigible sense.

Nor does it mean unanimity, universal agreement, or permanent closure. It identifies a historically bounded condition in which a proposition has acquired sufficient specialist standing to function as an operative scientific commitment in the relevant community.

Thus:

Operative\ Status \neq Truth,

Operative\ Status \neq Unanimity,

and

Operative\ Status \neq Irreversibility.

The article is about what happens when a claim with that status is publicly represented, not about whether the community will ultimately prove correct.

2.3 Scientific justification is not sufficient for source eligibility

Not every scientifically respectable proposition qualifies.

A newly published result may be scientifically justified without yet being operative across a relevant specialist community. A prominent scientist's public statement may possess substantial authority without being a community-operative scientific claim. A prize, press release, public controversy, or later historical success cannot retroactively establish the source status required by the model.

Therefore:

Scientific\ Justification \not\Rightarrow Operative\ Community\ Status.

This restriction makes PEHI narrower than Gerken's general category of public scientific testimony, which can include testimony appropriately based on scientific justification without the additional requirement of prior community-operativity (Gerken 2022).

2.4 Source-Status Memo

Before a core public representation is coded, the source claim receives a Source-Status Memo:

SSM(q_S)=(q_S,\mathcal C,E_{op},t_{op}),

recording the exact or narrowest defensible source proposition, the relevant specialist community, the evidence supporting operative status, and the latest defensible date by which that status was established.

Core admission in the present study requires at least two non-redundant forms of source-status evidence. Depending on domain, these may include specialist syntheses, professional guidelines, routine dependence on the proposition in specialist practice, convergent disciplinary assessments, textbook or training incorporation, or explicit evidence of expert consensus or stable professional uptake.

This two-source-type requirement is a methodological safeguard for the present audit, not a proposed universal definition of scientific consensus.

Most importantly:

Public\ Prominence \not\Rightarrow Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S)

and

Later\ Vindication \not\Rightarrow Earlier\ Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S).

3. Prior Art and the Residual Contribution

3.1 Epistemic dependence, expertise, and public trust

PEHI begins from, rather than disputes, the legitimacy of epistemic dependence. Hardwig (1985) identifies the structural dependence of modern knowledge on the epistemic work of others. Goldman (2001) asks how non-experts can assess competing expert claims. Anderson (2011) develops second-order criteria for lay assessment of scientific testimony. Irzik and Kurtulmuş (2019) analyze conditions of warranted epistemic public trust in science. Barimah (2024) emphasizes that lay second-order assessment is itself difficult and that scientific communicators must share the resulting epistemic burden.

PEHI does not add a competing theory of public trust or expert dependence.

3.2 Gerken: the nearest foundational predecessor

Gerken provides the strongest local predecessor. Scientific Testimony characterizes scientific testimony through its proper basis in scientific justification, distinguishes scientific expert testimony from science reporting, and analyzes both intra-scientific and public scientific testimony (Gerken 2022).

Two parts are especially important here. First, Non-Inheritance of Scientific Justification rejects the assumption that a successful testimonial exchange normally transfers to the recipient the same kind or degree of scientific justification possessed at the source. Second, Justification Reporting proposes that science reporters should, where feasible, report appropriate aspects of the nature and strength of the scientific justification supporting a reported scientific hypothesis.

PEHI therefore does not claim novelty for distinguishing scientific justification from source prestige, for analyzing science reporting as public scientific testimony, or for asking whether scientific justification has been appropriately represented.

3.3 Appropriate simplification

Gelfert and Schneider (2025) make the collision closer. Justification Reporting necessarily involves simplification, and the assumption that such simplification can routinely remain appropriate requires defense. Misleading framing or oversimplification can change the epistemic character of public reporting even where the communicator is acting in good faith.

Gerken (2026) responds that proper simplification is difficult but tractable and that it must be sensitive to context, audience, and platform.

Accordingly, appropriate simplification is not a PEHI novelty claim, and neither is the observation that a headline, lead, and body can differ epistemically.

3.4 Consensus-sensitive reporting

Pils (2025) argues that science reporting should represent the epistemic configuration of relevant expert communities, including where consensus exists, where it does not, and how strong agreement or disagreement is.

PEHI therefore cannot claim novelty for the proposition that public reporting should track expert epistemic conditions. The source-status gate performs a different role: it determines whether a bounded proposition qualifies for the target source class before its public representation is audited.

3.5 Knowledge in transit

The movement and translation of scientific knowledge across contexts are established research objects. Secord (2004) explicitly proposes treating science as communication and emphasizes movement, translation, and transmission. Star and Griesemer (1989) show how heterogeneous communities coordinate through translation and boundary objects without requiring conceptual identity.

Thus, the proposition that knowledge changes in transit is not a PEHI contribution.

The same limitation applies within the broader RATIUM.AI corpus. Related work already distinguishes scientific warrant from scientific authority, treats cross-domain handoffs and added premises as auditable objects, and emphasizes that the authority of a source cannot silently substitute for target-domain warrant (RATIUM.AI 2026b). PEHI does not introduce a new general theory of claim travel, authority migration, or generic transformation records.

3.6 Empirical source-to-report comparison

Operational comparison of scientific sources and public reporting is also not new. Sumner et al. (2014) compare peer-reviewed biomedical articles, academic press releases, and news reports and code transformations such as correlational findings represented causally, non-human findings generalized to humans, and research findings converted into behavioral advice.

This demonstrates that at least some changes in claim type, scope, and implication can be operationalized rather than diagnosed impressionistically. PEHI treats such work as methodological precedent.

3.7 PEHI versus Justification Reporting

The strongest redundancy objection is:

PEHI = Justification\ Reporting + Source\ Comparison.

If that equation captures all of PEHI's work, the architecture should be abandoned.

The relevant distinction is not that PEHI can discover errors inaccessible to Gerken's framework. It cannot claim that.

Justification Reporting is principally a communication norm: what should science reporters communicate about scientific justification?

PEHI is a pre-specified audit sequence for a restricted source class: which mature scientific source-to-public episodes enter analysis, how source relations are reconstructed, which dimensions are compared, and which inferences the analyst is prohibited from drawing.

The amount of communicated scientific justification does not determine the materiality diagnosis. Sparse (J_P) does not by itself establish a material transformation, and rich (J_P) does not exclude one.

A short statement may communicate little scientific justification while preserving the source proposition's material inferential boundaries; a detailed representation may communicate substantial evidence while expanding scope, changing claim type, or adding an unsupported bridge.

3.8 Residual contribution

The maximum-defensible contribution is therefore:

PEHI is a source-gated audit architecture that independently establishes the operative status of a bounded scientific claim, requires an analytically traceable source-to-public relation, reconstructs representation-unit-specific material changes through an inferential-difference test, requires the audit of materially stronger targets to identify their bridge and warrant, tests whether material transitions remain reconstructable from the representational record, distinguishes communicated scientific justification from audience-facing provenance and observable acceptance cues, explicitly separates representation analysis from claims about actual recipient uptake, and excludes bridge-dominant extrapolations from ordinary science-to-public handoffs.

No individual component is claimed as novel. The bridge/warrant language and the recoverability terminology are used procedurally rather than as claims to a new theory of argumentation, transparency, or message reconstruction. The RATIUM.AI sources cited for conceptual lineage establish construct provenance and architectural continuity; they are not treated as independent external validation.

Across the literatures examined, these functions are substantially represented but distributed. The proposed increment is their organization and sequencing around a specified operative source, traceable public handoff, and specified public representation as a restricted unit of audit.

4. Object and Scope

4.1 Source claim

The source object is:

q_S.

It must be stated propositionally and as narrowly as the scientific record permits. “Climate science,” “evolution,” “modern medicine,” or “what scientists know” are not valid source objects.

This discipline matters because scientific authority may attach to a field, institution, theory, or expert while evidential warrant remains claim-specific.

4.2 Public representation

The receiving object is:

r_P.

It may be an institutional public summary, science-journalism article, public expert statement, educational text, press release, documentary statement, museum representation, or another artifact presenting a claim as scientifically grounded.

An artifact need not be epistemically homogeneous. Accordingly:

r_P= \{r_{headline},r_{lead},r_{body},r_{caption},r_{callout},r_{graphic},r_{interface},\ldots\}.

These are Representation Units. A Representation Unit need not be textual. It may be textual, visual, graphical, interface-based, or mixed. Medium is not treated as an independent PEHI integrity dimension, and the audit does not infer a medium's psychological effect on recipients. The relevant question is whether the specified unit itself presents a materially different claim type, uncertainty structure, scope, boundary, justificatory status, or added premise (RATIUM.AI 2026e).

A transformation identified in one unit is not automatically attributed to the artifact as a whole:

Unit\text{-}Level\ Transformation \neq Artifact\text{-}Level\ Transformation.

A broad headline followed by a precise qualification is analytically different from a broad headline whose expansion remains operative throughout the body.

4.3 Analytical Traceability

To enter PEHI analysis:

Trace_A(q_S,r_P)

must be satisfied.

Analytical Traceability means that the analyst possesses sufficient evidence of a documented source relation or identifiable carrier connecting the selected scientific source environment to the public representation. Direct citation, named sourcing, an official derivative document, an attributed interview, explicit reliance on a specialist synthesis, a documented institutional publication chain, or another identifiable transmission record may satisfy this requirement.

The relation may be direct or mediated:

q_S\rightarrow r_P

or:

q_S\rightarrow r_I\rightarrow r_P.

Chronological compatibility, semantic resemblance, shared subject matter, or the general prestige of a scientific field does not by itself establish Analytical Traceability (RATIUM.AI 2026c; RATIUM.AI 2026f).

The existence of semantically similar propositions is insufficient:

Similarity(q_S,r_P)\not\Rightarrow Trace_A(q_S,r_P).

4.4 Audience-facing provenance

Analytical traceability must be separated from:

Prov_P.

Audience-Facing Provenance asks what source relationship is visible to the recipient.

An analyst may reconstruct a source chain that is almost invisible in the public artifact. Conversely, an artifact may prominently cite a prestigious institution without rendering the relevant source proposition or its limits reconstructable.

Therefore:

Trace_A\neq Prov_P.

(Trace_A) is an eligibility condition. (Prov_P) is a coding field.

4.5 Presented Acceptance Basis

The metadata field:

PAB_P

denotes the Presented Acceptance Basis: observable cues that the artifact visibly offers in support of acceptance or deference.

These may include a named expert, institutional authority, scientific consensus, description of evidence, source citation, prize or status marker, or combinations of these.

PEHI does not infer that a reader actually trusted a claim because a prestigious institution appeared in the text. It may record only that the institution was foregrounded as an acceptance cue.

Accordingly, (PAB_P) is metadata rather than an independent integrity score.

4.6 Recipient boundary

Let:

E_R^{\mathcal R}

denote actual recipient epistemic status for recipient class (\mathcal R).

Then:

r_P\not\Rightarrow E_R^{\mathcal R}.

A public artifact alone does not establish what its audience believed, understood, inferred, remembered, rejected, or misunderstood. Claims about uptake require independent evidence.

PEHI therefore analyzes the representation and the epistemic basis it makes available, not actual audience psychology.

4.7 Claim-environment rule

Analytical traceability across the same source, carrier, author, institution, or artifact does not preserve epistemic authorization when the target proposition changes explanatory environment. A move from scientific description or mechanism to a stronger causal, ontological, metaphysical, normative, or action-guiding proposition must be treated as a target change. The audit must then identify the corresponding changes in claim type, scope, boundary, and added premises rather than allowing common authorship or source authority to carry warrant across the transition (RATIUM.AI 2026e; RATIUM.AI 2026f).

Thus:

Same\ Carrier\not\Rightarrow Same\ Epistemic\ Authorization.

PEHI may identify that a public representation has crossed into an action-guiding claim environment, but it does not assess whether the resulting action is institutionally authorized, implemented, contestable, correctable, or reversible. Those are downstream governance questions.

4.8 Excluded objects

The core architecture excludes:

• reporting on newly published studies where (Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S)) cannot yet be established;

• policy recommendation and evidence-to-decision conversion;

• administrative implementation;

• political mobilization;

• generic misinformation as a target class;

• trust-in-science outcomes;

• persuasion and recipient psychology.

It also excludes bridge-dominant extrapolation:

Scientific\ Resource + Substantial\ Philosophical/Normative\ Bridge \rightarrow Broader\ Claim.

Where the bridge rather than the scientific proposition performs the principal inferential work, the episode is not an ordinary PEHI core handoff.

5. Public Epistemic Handoff Integrity

5.1 Canonical definition

Public Epistemic Handoff Integrity (PEHI) is a source-gated audit architecture for reconstructing traceable transitions from scientific claims independently established as operative within specified specialist communities to specified public representations. It does not require literal fidelity, comprehensive transmission of scientific justification, or inference about actual audience uptake. It compares source-side and representation-side inferential commitments in order to distinguish legitimate compression from materially consequential transformation, while preserving explicit boundaries among scientific warrant, communicated justification, public provenance, observable authority cues, and recipient response.

The term integrity names the relation being audited. The contribution is the audit architecture.

5.2 Integrity is not informational preservation

The following implication is rejected:

More\ Information\Rightarrow Greater\ Integrity.

A technically detailed public account may still expand scope or add an unsupported conclusion.

Likewise:

Less\ Information\Rightarrow Lower\ Integrity

is rejected. A single sentence may legitimately summarize a large scientific synthesis.

Thus:

\boxed{Integrity\neq Information\ Volume.}

5.3 Integrity is not literal fidelity

Public translation normally changes vocabulary, density, syntax, granularity, examples, and explanatory form.

Therefore:

\boxed{Integrity\neq Semantic\ Immobility.}

This keeps PEHI compatible with the literature on necessary and context-sensitive simplification rather than treating public accessibility as a defect (Gelfert and Schneider 2025; Gerken 2026).

5.4 Source and public justification

Let:

J_S

denote the scientific justification available at the source and:

J_P

the relevant nature or strength of that justification communicated by (r_P).

Normally:

J_P<J_S

in informational richness.

That inequality is not a failure condition. The recipient need not become a specialist, and the public artifact need not reproduce the source community's scientific record.

5.5 Scientific content and distributed scientific authority

The epistemic content of a scientific claim and the socially distributed authority attached to its scientific source are analytically non-identical:

S_c\neq S_a,

where (S_c) denotes scientific content and (S_a) denotes socially distributed scientific authority. A bounded scientific result may acquire broad public standing because science, a scientific institution, or a prominent expert is regarded as reliable, objective, or authoritative. Such authority may legitimately function as provenance, evidence of specialist standing, or an observable basis for public deference. It does not by itself warrant an expanded scope, stronger claim type, added premise, or changed explanatory target (RATIUM.AI 2026f).

PEHI therefore records presented acceptance cues without allowing them to compensate for an unsupported inferential transition. The notation is schematic and does not treat (PAB_P) or distributed authority as scalar quantities:

PAB_P\not\Rightarrow Warrant(P_P).

5.6 Inferential-Difference Test

Materiality is assessed through an explicit adversarial procedure.

Let:

P_S

be the strongest proposition defensibly attributable to the source environment in the relevant context, and:

P_P

the strongest proposition defensibly expressed by the relevant public Representation Unit.

A transformation is epistemically material when:

\boxed{ InferentialCommitments(P_S) \neq InferentialCommitments(P_P) }

with respect to at least one relevant dimension.

The principal dimensions are:

\{T,U,S,B,AP\},

where:

• (T) = claim type;

• (U) = uncertainty or confidence structure;

• (S) = scope or applicability;

• (B) = substantive boundary;

• (AP) = added premise or conclusion.

Examples of prima facie material changes include:

Association\rightarrow Causation,

Animal\ Finding\rightarrow Human\ Claim,

90\%\rightarrow All,

or:

Evidence\text{-}Strength\ Classification \rightarrow Risk\text{-}Magnitude\ Claim.

By contrast, stronger rhetoric, shorter phrasing, metaphor, stylistic simplification, or omission of inferentially irrelevant detail does not pass the test merely because the language changed.

Before coding a difference as material, the analyst must state and test the strongest plausible non-material interpretation.

5.7 Material transformation is not automatically integrity failure

Even:

Material(\Delta)=Yes

does not by itself establish a defective handoff.

A public representation may explicitly mark an additional premise, scope shift, or inferential extension. A material transition may also remain reconstructable even where the public proposition is stronger than its source. The principal concern is therefore unsupported, insufficiently marked, or non-reconstructable inferential expansion, not transformation as such.

Thus:

Epistemic\ Transformation\neq Epistemic\ Failure.

6. Operationalization and Coding Protocol

6.1 Eligibility gates

Every proposed core episode passes two gates before representation analysis.

Gate 1 — Source status

Op_{\mathcal C}(q_S).

Gate 2 — Analytical traceability

Trace_A(q_S,r_P).

Failure of either gate yields:

Not\ a\ Core\ Handoff.

No integrity failure follows merely from exclusion.

6.2 Public Handoff Record

For an eligible episode, the record contains: